Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain argument” assesses the problems in the study of justice by denying all patterned theories of justice. He argues, namely, that all patterned theories of justice fail to uphold the liberties of the individual by way of limiting the exchange of goods and services for the aim of the proper distribution of rights. If this is true, and the individual’s liberties are being violated by patterned theories of justice, then patterned theories of justice are flawed. Thus, one is left with unpatterned theories of justice: the very sort of theory that Nozick intends to argue toward.
I will show that Nozick is incorrect in his conclusion, by means of further discussion of the Wilt Chamberlain example, in light of game theory and Rawls’ “veil of ignorance”. To do this, a brief introduction to game theory and the veil of ignorance is necessary, followed by an explanation of Nozick’s argument against patterned theories of justice. I will demonstrate that, given the two techniques of game theory and the veil of ignorance, the Wilt Chamberlain case falls apart. For, if individuals were acting rationally, one would be able to see, through reason, that the overinvestment in an individual, product, business, etc… leads to inequalities; and, given that individuals would project these inequalities through reason, they would limit their investment in said individuals, products, businesses, etc… to the point that inequalities would not occur. Though this idea appears convoluted and vague, it can be simply put that I intend to show that the people in the Wilt Chamberlain case are not acting rationally, nor in their own self-interest. Thus, the argument does not show distributional patterned theories of justice to be false.
Game Theory and The Veil of Ignorance
In this essay, I intend to use the tools of game theory and Rawls’ veil of ignorance in order to dismantle the Wilt Chamberlain argument. Before the full refutation can be presented, though, it is necessary to gather what is meant by these two ideas. First, game theory is a technique in theorizing potential outcomes; moreover, it assumes that people act in their own rational self-interest when making decisions. Secondly, the veil of ignorance is of central use in John Rawls’ theory regarding justice. In essence, while behind the imaginary veil, one discards all morally irrelevant features (ethnicity, sex, etc…) and acts in one’s self-interest. The consequences from this are simple: one is able to act in the interest of the group. For when one is behind the veil, one could be anybody; and if one could be anybody, while acting in one’s self-interest, one is acting in the interest of everybody. With these ideas now firmly understood, we may move toward the argument against Nozick.
The Wilt Chamberlain Case
The Wilt Chamberlain argument begins in assuming that a given society lives by a patterned theory of justice–more specifically, a theory that is patterned by the principle of egalitarianism. In this egalitarian society, Wilt Chamberlain bargains with his basketball team’s owners to receive 25¢ from every ticket purchased for a game. If one assumes that one million people attend the games throughout the season, then Wilt Chamberlain is $250,000 dollars richer, while the all others are 25¢ poorer. If, though, this were the case in such a society, it would be unjust; and thus, it would not be allowed. Its injustice would be founded on the principle that the worst off in a society are not better off in this scenario (the difference principle).
However, if the egalitarian society limits people in their ability to exchange goods and services, then their rights and liberties are being violated. If their rights are being violated, then the society is unjust. And so this example, Nozick says, defeats the patterned theory:
[N]o end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without continuous interference with people’s lives. Any favored pattern would be transformed into one unfavored by the principle, by people choosing to act in various ways…. (Nozick, 163)
By this, Nozick intends to show that all patterned theories of justice interfere with the members of the society, in order to uphold the principle. The given patterned society S1, would be altered to become S2 (another patterned society) through the free choices of individuals, which leads to S2 being contradictory to the principle that upholds the pattern. Therefore, in a sense, patterned theories of justice are self defeating.
The Wilt Chamberlain argument can be presented in standard form thusly:
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If a society requires the universal assent to a principle, then it sacrifices citizens’ liberties.
(a) If a society requires the universal assent to a principle, then it requires a pattern.
(b) If the society requires a pattern, then that pattern will be broken by persons’ actions.
(c) If that pattern will be broken by persons’ actions, then the citizens’ liberties are sacrificed to uphold the principle.
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All distributional patterned theories of justice require universal assent to a principle.
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/:. All distributional patterned theories of justice sacrifice citizens liberties.
In the following sections of this essay, I intend to deny the sub-premise (b) of premise 1, “If the society requires a pattern, then that pattern can be broken by persons’ actions”. I will show that not all patterned theories fall into this trap, but will demonstrate that an egalitarian society with individuals acting in their own rational self-interest behind the veil of ignorance would avoid the pattern being broken by their actions. It should be noted, at this point, that the egalitarian state described in the coming sections is a purely possible state. I do not intend to say that the world should be in this state; however, I will show that the claim “all patterned theories of justice are flawed” is false, by describing this possible state.
Rational Self-Interest and The Wilt Chamberlain Case Refuted
The question arises, at this point, “Were the 1 million people acting rationally in the Wilt Chamberlain case?” Clearly, the answer is no. For if they were, they would see that their actions would lead to an inequality in society. Such an inequality is not in the rational self-interest of any person; and, thus, if they were acting rationally, they would not attend the basketball games. If this line of thought is true, then the Wilt Chamberlain case is flawed. However, in order to make this argument more clear, there needs to be described a state that would arise from acting rationally from behind the veil of ignorance.
Rational Self-Interest
Such an egalitarian state assumes that all people in its bounds are acting upon the same techniques to decide individual decisions: namely, game theory (acting rationally and in one’s self interest) behind the veil of ignorance. Assuming that this possible patterned theory of justice is operating with such assumptions, the conclusion that more goods and services are being given to those with morally irrelevant features is irrational.
When one is behind the veil, one is hypothetically anybody with any morally irrelevant features (tall, short, athletic, clumsy, etc…). For instance, if one is, in reality, exceptionally good at math and acts in his self-interest, such a person would favor mathematicians in society. This desire is both rational and in his own self-interest. However, if this person were to go behind the veil of ignorance, his morally irrelevant feature of excelling at math would not be able to be considered. Thus, this person could either be good or bad at math; and so, by acting rationally, he will not favor mathematicians more than non-mathematicians, simply because when the veil is lifted, he could be either of these two things. Thus, it is in his best interest to desire a structure of society that treats those good at math as equal to those bad at math. And therefore, such a society that used this method of formulation would not favor any morally irrelevant feature over any other.
The Wilt Chamberlain Case Refuted
If such a possible patterned theory of justice were considered in the context of Nozick’s argument, the Wilt Chamberlain case would be of no effect. It is not in the rational self-interest of the egalitarian society to pay money toward Wilt Chamberlain’s morally irrelevant feature. This is apparent simply because those with athletic talent will not be favored over those without athletic talent (via the veil of ignorance).
To reintroduce the claim being refuted, it is sub-premise (b) from above, “If the society requires a pattern, then that pattern will be broken by persons’ actions”. Given the egalitarian society described, this premise is clearly false. If the possible egalitarian society mandates the use of game theory and the veil of ignorance, no person would so much as desire to contribute to inequalities through morally irrelevant features, for it is not in their self-interest. And thus, the state is not prohibiting such transactions, the actions simply would not be reasonable, defendable, nor justified.
Further Considerations
As with any attempt at creating an argument in philosophy, there are further considerations and potential refutations to consider. Of the argument provided in this paper, it is clear that there are many possible refutations; the strongest of these centers on the idea that the possible state described (the possible distributional patterned theory of justice) still falls into Nozick’s trap of limiting people’s liberties and rights to engage in transactions. The argument would attack the claim that such a state would naturally withhold itself from making transactions; and if people are not able to exchange goods and services, their rights are being limited and violated.
This refutation is taken to heart, although it would seem to me to miss the entire point of the argument. This possible patterned theory of justice implies that every individual in it is acting rationally with no tendencies to favor morally irrelevant features. If such a state is considered, then no individual would partake in giving money to Wilt Chamberlain for his basketball. It is not a limit on the rights of the people, it is a realization that it is not in their self-interest to buy the basketball ticket. If such a state could be imagined, then Nozick’s conclusion that all patterned theories of justice sacrifice the liberties of the individuals is considerable flawed; for above is described a state in which the liberties of the individuals is not being limited, rather, their liberties are being discovered.
Conclusion
The ultimate trap in philosophy is the making of absolute statements, for all that is needed to refute the claim, then, is one small possible world that contradicts the claim. Nozick fell into this trap with the Wilt Chamberlain argument, much how anarchists fall into a trap when saying, “all possible states violate the individual’s rights”. The claim that all possible distributional patterned theories of justice limit individual’s liberties, thus, is too large of a claim to make through the Wilt Chamberlain example. To deny that it would not defeat some patterned theories of justice is absurd; however, to make such wide sweeping claims with such a small argument is bold, to say the least.
It has been shown, through the Wilt Chamberlain argument, that there are possible patterned states that do not infringe on the rights of the citizens. And, through this conclusion, it can be argued that these patterned theories of justice are favorable to an unpatterned theory. It would be hopeful to say that all people act rationally and in their self-interest; in fact, most people do not do either of these things, let alone both of these things. However, the point remains that not all possible patterned theories of justice violate the liberties of people. Rather, given the steps these theories take, their liberties are not being violate, but upheld.
A Collection of Essays 