In this paper, I argue that science fiction literature (science fiction film, in particular), challenges a central philosophical claim of Wittgenstein’s. The suggestion is that, “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him”, which can be made universal (and more accurate to Wittgenstein’s view) by simply rephrasing it to say, “If a non-human entity could talk, we could not understand it”. However, it is through the lense of film, as a narrative text, that one is able to see, hear, and feel the experiences of non-human entities (whether they be robots, aliens, or something of the like). I use three films to criticize Wittgenstein’s quote: Alphaville, Hardware, and District 9, spoken of in their respective historical order. From these three examples I sufficiently development an attack on Wittgenstein’s quote, finally suggesting that he was mistaken in his claim.
It is necessary, before delving into our films, to understand Wittgenstein’s quote more fully. This will aid us in both understanding how to respond to it and what consequences follow from the response. Our universally formulated version of Wittgenstein’s view (that, “If a non-human entity could talk, we could not understand it”) can be amended further, for clarification.
Three amendments to be considered: (i) what should be considered a non-human entity, (ii) what do we mean by “talking”, and (iii) what do we mean by “understanding”. Let us take each individually.
- Non-Human Entities: We must take this simply to mean something that does not fulfill the definition of “human entity”. We can take “human entity” to be something that contains the DNA sequences necessary for the biological form of the species in question. Thus, something that is not that is the subject we speak of.
- Talking: The term “talking” will be used loosely for our purposes. It should be understood as any action that transfers information.
iii. Understanding: The term “understanding” can simply be taken as the passive action of obtaining information, processing information, and gaining knowledge of information that has been transferred to the individual through some means.
Here, then, is the doubly-amended view in question: “If something that does not contain the DNA sequences necessary for the biological form of the human species could transfer information, we could not obtain, process, or gain knowledge of the information being transferred from said non-human entity”. From this point, we can move forward to analyze whether this claim is true.
Science fiction film, as a narrative text, explores the relations between humans and non-human entities. The non-human entities often come in the form of either some sort of intelligent machine or alien species that has come into contact with humans. An intriguing aspect of this genre, however, is that the non-human entities (whatever they may be in any given narrative text) are able to communicate with humans, on some rudimentary level. What, then, do we make of these interactions? I suggest that it lends evidence against Wittgenstein’s view that if non-humans could talk, we could not understand them. I offer three examples from science fiction film that suggest that the ability of humans to empathize negates Wittgenstein’s view.
- Alphaville (1965)
In Alphaville, we see the emergence of a self-conscious supercomputer, and hear its muddled and confused account of its personal growth from purely logical thinking to poetic thinking. The film is narrated by Alpha 60, the self-conscious supercomputer, and can be thought of as its first attempt at poetic storytelling. In essence, it is telling its creation account.
There are a number of elements that make this fictional work believable, though. First, the sound in the film is choppy, disconnected, and often feels uncomfortable and confusing. Second, the spatial reality of the film is disorienting and sometimes makes little sense, even after analyzing specific scenes. This is clearest while Lemmy Caution (our protagonist) first enters his hotel room in Alphaville. During a random, unexpected fight scene (which itself is awkward and unexplained by our narrator) the spectator gets a layout of the hotel room. There are a number of strange spatial anomalies, however, and they go unexplained. Lastly, there are a number of strange plot holes that are left unexplained. Namely, toward the end of the film and at the moment of Lemmy Caution’s “success”, the citizens of Alphaville begin acting strangely, sliding across walls, rather than walking down the hallway. While this confusion is occurring, there are clearly cars driving with great success in the background; however, wouldn’t the cars be chaotically operating, given that the humans of Alphaville are not fully functioning? These three narrative peculiarities give us a glimpse into the mind of Alpha 60, our non-human, narrating supercomputer.
However confusing Alpha 60’s account may be, the audience still understands the plot, connects with the characters, and can analyze specific aspects of the narrative. What we have, then, is a fictional case of (i) a non-human entity (ii) that can transfer information which (iii) is also understood by humans.
- Hardware (1990)
Hardware is a science fiction thriller involving a ferocious fight between M.A.R.K. 13 (a robot programmed to kill humans) and a number of humans in a post-apocalyptic world. It is not evidenced whether M.A.R.K. 13 (M13) is self-conscious, or even aware of his purpose, but this is not of importance to our goal. M13 is an entity that can communicate through its actions. Throughout the film, there are a few first-person shots from M13’s perspective. Yes, we are not experiencing M13’s visual experience, for it must b e translated through our visual experience, but we are able to understand the information being transferred. Seeing M13’s first-person perspective fulfills our definition of “talking”, then, since it transfers visual information to another entity. Furthermore, we are able to understand this visual information. Therefore, we have three narrative elements that consequentially come from Hardware: (i) we have a non-human entity that (ii) is able to transfer information (through its behavior), and (iii) the one’s receiving the information can understand it.
iii. District 9 (2009)
In District 9 we witness the development, and ultimately the rejection, of aliens as part of human society. In the movie, one encounters a number of non-human entities living in a slum in South Africa. The aliens are subject to repeated instances of discrimination, distrust, and general hatred, however the film aims to have the audience understand their point of view, and, ultimately, empathize with the non-humans.
Throughout the movie, there are a large number of vocal communications between humans and aliens. And, in fact, there seems to be some amount of translation that occurs amongst the two groups, so that they understand one another. We have, then, (i) non-human entities that (ii) transfer information (vocally) to humans, and (iii) the humans sufficiently understand the non-humans.
It has been suggested that, “If something that does not contain the DNA sequences necessary for the biological form of the human species could transfer information, we could not obtain, process, or gain knowledge of the information being transferred from said non-human entity”. The above examples offer three cases where:
(i) a non-human entity exists,
(ii) a non-human entity transfers information to humans, and
(iii) humans understand the information being transferred to them from a non-human source.
If (i)-(iii) are true, which it has been shown that they are, then Wittgenstein’s claim does not go through, and one is left with inter-species communication.
Wittgenstein’s assertion intends to block the possibility of communication across species lines. This is accomplished through work in the philosophy of language and epistemology, which suggest that the experiences that non-humans have with the world is so different from the experiences that humans have with the world that they would be unable to communicate, whatsoever.
The study of science fiction as narrative text (and film, in particular) challenges this notion. It shows, instead, that film allows the human to empathize and, ultimately, come to understand the position of the non-human. This thesis has been defended by three examples in film. First, Alphaville demonstrated that a fictional supercomputer could express its experiences (however poorly the computer may do it); next, Hardware shows that a robot can express its innerworkings through the actions it performs; and, lastly, District 9 illustrates a situation where non-humans are so acutely understood that the audience supports them over the human race (and rightfully so). It may be sufficiently concluded, then, that Wittgenstein was mistaken when he claimed that, “If a lion could talk, we could not understand it”.
A Collection of Essays 