I. Introduction
David Lewis’s famous essay Do We Believe in Penal Substitution offers insights into the Christian Theory of Penal Substitution (STPS) and Secular views of penal substitution, of which, there are multiple versions. Lewis defends the thesis that Christians are of two minds in relation to penal substitution, however, every person, Christian or non-Christian, is of two minds in relation to penal substitution; thus, non-Christians should not rebuke Christians for their two mindedness.
I will begin this paper summarizing primary tenets, definitions, and arguments that Lewis provides. Following this summary, I will evaluate Lewis’s responses to a specific argument against penal substitution, concluding that it does not sufficiently counter it. I will argue that the theory of penal substitution is not a viable theory and another theory should be adopted.
II. Preliminary Summary of Lewis
David Lewis begins his paper with a scenario designed to appeal to one’s intuition. Suppose that a criminal has been justly sentenced to be punished. In the courtroom, while the sentencing is occurring, an innocent friend of the criminal stands up and declares, “I will take the punishment for my friend.” The judge, considering the situation, has two options: either (i) allow the innocent friend to serve the criminal’s sentence, or else (ii) do not allow the innocent friend to serve the criminal’s sentence. It appears, intuitively, that (ii) is the more just option.
The fact that (ii) appeals to our intuition gives rise to an important question: What should we consider as the function of criminal punishment? Lewis addresses this question with six possible answers; they are:
(i) it is the paying back of a moral debt,
(ii) it is better for the wicked not to prosper,
(iii) it is an expression of society’s hatred of the wicked’s actions,
(iv) it is a means to reforming the character’s of the wicked,
(v) it is a way to deprive the wicked of their resources, or
(vi) it is a compensatory function.
It is clear that (i)-(v) do not allow for the substitution of an innocent friend to satisfy the function of punishment. (vi), however, does. Lewis, then, narrows his focus on the compensatory function of punishment (CFP). Here is his definition:
CFP: x is compensatory iff&b x provides a benefit to the victim of a crime.
It follows that an innocent substitute could serve the sentence instead of the guilty party, so long as it provides a benefit to the victim. There are a number of problems with CFP; two in particular are:
(i) A murderer’s victim cannot be compensated, as they are no longer alive, and
(ii) An innocent friend is not sufficient compensation to a given victim.
Lewis notes, then, that it seems that no reason exists for believing in penal substitution, given that penal substitution is defined as
Penal Substitution: a is an act of penal substitution iff&b in performing a, an innocent substitute is punished to repay the moral debt of a guilty person, rather than the guilty person repaying the moral debt.
There are many people who do believe in penal substitution, though; specifically, many Christians. According to a specific theory of the Doctrine of the Atonement (The Theory of Penal Substitution), (i) humans are guilty of sinning and have a “moral debt” to God, (ii) Christ served as an innocent substitute to pay the moral debt, and (iii) God recognizes Christ’s substitution as a valid payment. Thus, Christ is a valid penal substitute for our sins.
Even given the theory, outside of the context of theology, Christians still tend to deny penal substitution as a sufficient way to deal with crime. Lewis argues from this point to conclude that Christians are of two minds. They both believe in penal substitution and do not believe in penal substitution. Lewis, rightly so, thinks of this as a bad state to be in.
Lewis then discusses a second problem for the Atonement, of which I will primarily focus on in this paper. Here it is in Standard Form:
The Insufficient Payment Argument Against the Theory of Atonement (IPTA)
(1) Though death by crucifixion is a terrible occurrence, one soul suffering eternal damnation is an even more terrible occurrence.
(2) If (1), then Christ did not “pay the debt” for even one sinner by dying on the cross.
(3) /:. Christ did not “pay the debt” for even one sinner by dying on the cross.
The punishment we face for our wrongdoings is eternal punishment. Christ did not endure eternal punishment (which is far worse than crucifixion). So, he did not pay our debt. Lewis offers two replies to this argument:
(i) A denial of premise (1): Christ had to bear the sins of every human and be forsaken by God, so he was not only crucified.
And,
(ii) A denial of premise (2): Christ paid enough of the debt to save the sinners; an equation can show the denial’s strength: [death by crucifixion+the bearing of our sins+being forsaken by God]=a finite amount of damnation that is enough to forgive our wrongs.
Lewis suggests that these denials are sufficient to discount the IPTA argument. He then states that, in fact, all people (Christian and non-Christian) are of two minds about penal substitution, concluding that non-Christians should be tolerable of the Christian two mindedness, for they also are two minded. I, however, will focus on his denial of the IPTA argument.
III. Refutation of David Lewis
In this section, I will argue that Lewis did not sufficiently respond to the IPTA argument. From this argument, I will conclude that either (a) The Christian Theory of Penal Substitution is false and there is some alternative view, or (b) Christians must offer a sound response to IPTA. I will suggest that (a) is the preferable position to hold.
A. Response to the Denial of Premise (1)
What does “to bear the sins of x” entail? Let us say that I have sinned against my younger sister, seeing that I owe a moral debt to her, and failure to pay the debt will result in punishment, my older sister “bears my sin”, so as to reconcile my sibling relationship; what would that look like? I take at least two options for what it would entail:
(i’) She experiences the emotional response to the realization that I have sinned; ie. felt my guilt of wronging my sister.
Or,
(i’’) She experienced the literal transfer of my sin on to her “being”.
So, (i’) would entail an empathetic response; (i’’) would entail an incredibly strange metaphysical and moral “swap” of sin. Both options are clearly absurd, though. Empathy has no agency, it is only a personal response to another’s situation; an empathetic psychological state does not lead one to the “bearing” of the state of another person (ie. If one person empathizes with a starving person, they do not experience or bear the weight of starvation). (i’’) is even more absurd, though. Moral wrongdoing cannot be transferred to another person. I take it, then, that (i) is false, and premise (1) of IPTA still stands.
B. Response to the Denial of Premise (2)
The second denial of Lewis appeals to an equation. Dealing with punishment of infinite proportion is tricky, so perhaps it would be easier to see an example of what Lewis is arguing. Consider a burglar case:
A burglar has just been convicted. An innocent bystander stands up and states, “I will serve the sentence for him. However, I will only serve the sentence until it has been sufficiently paid off! If the sentence is for 10 years and the victim feels the moral debt has been paid after five years, then I would like to be released after five years.”
The case, then, shows that, so long as the moral debt is sufficiently paid, full payment is not necessary. But this seems strange to say. It is trivializing the punishment. If we should suffer eternal damnation for our wrongdoings, no finite amount of suffering from one man will suffice for its payment. The proportions are simply incomparable.
What’s more, the second objection of Lewis appeals to the first objection, which has been shown to be flawed. Thus, it can be concluded that Lewis’s response to the IPTA argument is not sufficient. We cannot ignore the argument.
C. A Way Forward
Thus far, it has been shown that the IPTA argument still stands; penal substitutionists do not sufficiently respond to it. I see two directions forward:
(i) Do away with penal substitution as a theory of Atonement and look for alternative theories,
or
(ii) Offer other responses to the IPTA argument that do sufficiently respond to it.
I, myself, cannot see (ii) as feasible; the theory of penal substitution is riddled with flaws (many of which haven’t been presented in this paper). If (ii) is most likely not feasible, then we must do away with penal substitution as a theory of Atonement and look for alternative theories. I will not offer any substantive analysis of the other options, but they do exist. Namely, those of Eleonore Stump and Richard Swinburne, to name two.
IV. Conclusion
I have argued that David Lewis’s treatment of IPTA is insufficient in its refutation. The two responses, when looked at closely, do not hold weight. Because of this, IPTA still stands as a good argument against penal substitution, which leads us to only one option: do away with the theory of penal substitution and adopt another theory.
A Collection of Essays 