On Nonsense

1. A (Brief) Introduction

In this essay, I will present arguments for both Frege’s Theory of Meaninglessness (FTM) and Wittgenstein’s Theory of Nonsense (WTN). I will evaluate these arguments, showing that WTN is the favorable theory for nonsense in general language, also giving a Wittgensteinian argument against FTM as a theory for meaninglessness in general language. Following this, I will demonstrate that FTM is appropriate in certain contexts, namely scientific contexts (or any context in which describing the world is the function of the language) and is compatible with a sub-thesis of WTN, although WTN remains the favorable theory for the general use of language, given its explanatory power.

II. Frege’s Theory of Meaninglessness

It is appropriate to start this essay by first giving a brief account of Frege’s general theory of language, before moving to his theory of meaninglessness. It is important to note that Frege was responding to a popular philosophic position; namely, Millianism. Millianism’s central tenet holds that proper names “tag” their referent; or, in other words, a name’s meaning is what it refers to. If Millianism is true, though, it has serious trouble when one referent has two names which are not interchangeable in a sentence. He sought to offer a theory that avoided Millianism’s downfall.

Beginning his inquiry, Frege presented to us a famous dilemma: either Hesperus and Phosphorus are different planets, or we can refer to the same planet (Venus) with two different names. It is obvious, though, that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same planet. Thus, we can refer to the same planet with at least two different names. Using this example, Frege established that there are two fundamental elements to names: their referent and their sense. Two statements about one referent have different senses. So, for the “Hesperus is Phosphorus” example, we derive this:

“Hesperus is Phosphorus”

(1) Referent: the same (Venus)

(2) Hesperus’s sense: the brightest star in the morning sky

(3) Phosphorus’s sense: the brightest star in the evening sky

Thus, we have one referent with two senses, and are able to see Frege’s primary conclusion: every meaningful name and sentence has one referent and multiple senses.

From his general theory, what can we make of Frege’s Theory of Meaninglessness? It is best explained by example, with a statement of his formulated theory following. Frege observes this sentence: “Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep”. Is this statement true? Or is it false? Frege argues that it is neither; rather, the sentence is meaningless (perhaps more accurately, referent-less).

“Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep”cvjj

(1) Referent: None (Odysseus is fictional)

(2) Sense: a person who is set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep

As can be seen, there is no referent, as Odysseus is fictional, thus the sentence is meaningless. We have, now, an understanding of FTM; let us see it in definite terms:

FTM: x is meaningless iff&b x does not have a referent.

A quick note is appropriate before moving to Wittgenstein’s theory. The title of this paper is “On Nonsense”. Why is it, then, that I have defined Frege’s theory on meaninglessness? This is primarily due to Frege’s theory itself. Given that he defines “sense” in a specific way, it would be insufficient to call his theory “Frege’s Theory of Nonsense”, such a title would refer to “sense” in the wrong way. Wittgenstein is using “nonsense” in a synonymous way with “meaninglessness”; the context of Frege’s theory does not allow for this synonymous use.

III. Wittgenstein’s Theory of Nonsense

In his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein offers his general theory of language. This contrasted heavily with his earlier work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which solidified the language theory of the logical positivists and argued that the role of language is to align our pictures of reality with the facts of the world.

A picture of reality is either true or false: Early and Late Wittgenstein both agreed on this point. Late Wittgenstein noted, though, that if a picture of reality is either true or false, then the statement <five slabs> is either true or false. This is the dividing point between Early and Late Wittgenstein: Late Wittgenstein denied that the statement <five slabs> is true or false; rather, he noted that it had functional value. In a famous example, he notes that two construction workers (one a builder and the other a sort of aid to the builder) are using slabs to build a structure. The builder orders the aid by saying, “five slabs!”. After the aid brings five slabs back, he hands them to the builder reporting “five slabs”. The statement <five slabs>, then, has at least two operative roles (probably more; ie. question, etc…): a command and a report. Operative roles do not have truth values, and thus they are not true or false. Wittgenstein’s shift in opinion lies in his stress on meaning as use.

Wittgenstein moves from this point to describe language as a sort of game where meaning derives itself from its use, while context sets the rules of its use. Because context sets the rules, language can take infinite amount of forms, as there are an infinite amount of contexts (hypothetically, that is). So, Late Wittgenstein noted that statements have multiple meanings, depending on when, where, why, and how they are uttered. <five slabs> can mean any of these things: a command, a question, a report/statement, etc…. In fact, Wittgenstein suggested that there are an infinite amount of uses for a given statement.

What, then, is nonsense? He expresses WTN in two short sentences:

“When a sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless. But a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn from circulation”

A statement of his theory can be derived thusly:

WTN: x is nonsense iff&b x is being excluded from the language.

It will be helpful, now, to take note of an example. Consider a baby who, when acknowledged by her parents’ friend says, “Goo-goo. Ga-ga”. What sense is derived from this? None. It is a failed attempt to engage in a language-game with an adult. It is not to say, though, that the actual statements <goo-goo> and <ga-ga> are nonsense; rather, they are rejected from the language-game in the context of the example. As the definition suggests, the statements are excluded from the language; their exclusion is what makes them nonsense.

A further example will make the exclusion of the statements in the “baby-context” more clear. Consider a group of adults playing charades, or something of the like. One adult receives a card, stands up, and says, “Goo-goo. Ga-ga”. Now, even as a reader of this paper, what did the adult’s card instruct her to imitate? Clearly, a baby. There is a sense, then, in the statements <goo-goo> and <ga-ga>. It simply depends on the context in which they are uttered. If it is senseful, it is appropriate; if it is nonsense, it is inappropriate.

IV. WTN is the Favorable Theory

With firm grasps of WTN and FTM, we may now turn to an evaluation of the explanatory strength of WTN and FTM. I take, as an assumption, that if a theory of nonsense is to be sufficient, it must be able to explain

1. how the language is used, and
2. how it should not be used.

Note that I use is for (1) and should not for (2). By “how language is used”, I mean, it should give a descriptive account of how we use language; by “how it should not be used”, I mean, it should give an account of what is nonsense. I do not count “how language should be used” as the criteria for (1), because a theory of language is a descriptive account of language, not a prescriptive account. To offer a prescriptive account does not help in the understanding of what language is.

I will argue in this section that Wittgenstein fulfills (1) and (2), but Frege only fulfills (2); and, thus, WTN is the favorable theory. Let us begin with Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein, as stated above, suggests two main theses:

1’. Language derives its meaning from its use, and

2’. x is nonsense iff&b x is excluded from the language.

He fulfills the first criterion by describing how it is that language is used, and fulfills the second by suggesting how it should not be used, given the first criterion. Frege’s account is not so neat. He offers two primary conclusions, the first of which is an attempt at fulfilling (1), but he fails to fulfill it:

1’’. Meaningful statements have two elements: a referent and a sense(s), and

2’’. x is meaningless iff&b x does not have a referent.

How, though, does (1’’) insufficiently fulfill the first criteria? The answer is simple: there are plenty of normal, everyday sentences, that are used regularly, and, yet, fail to meet Frege’s (1’’). Here are two obvious ones:

1. “Harry Potter has a scar”,
2. “Rivendell is beautiful”.

Now, these sentences are used often, they seem to make sense to people, and seem meaningful, yet they do not have a referent. If this is the case, then Frege is not fulfilling (1), since he is inaccurately describing the nature of our language.

Some may reply to my treatment of Frege by pointing out that he was aiming toward a perfect language; we should be striving toward truth and falsity, not meaninglessness. My reply to this is simple: the statements above are not meaningless; they may not refer to a real object, yet we understand, use, and often enjoy such statements.

Even more, if we ignore my initial response, Frege is still not fulfilling the first criterion, for he is offering a “should” claim, rather than an “is” claim. One cannot offer a theory of meaninglessness from a “should” claim, it must come from a descriptive claim about the language. It seems impossible to define meaninglessness from a pre-observational standpoint, for meaninglessness is observable, one can hear when someone utters a meaningless sentence. And from the observation of its use, one can see that fiction is not meaningless. Thus, Frege does not fulfill (1).

V. FTM Defended in Scientific Contexts

We have seen that Frege’s theory fails as a general theory of nonsense, while Wittgenstein’s does not, in relation to explanatory power. I would like to now examine whether Frege’s theory is applicable in any realm of language use. I will argue that Frege’s theory is applicable in a certain context; namely, his theory is most useful in science, and does not conflict with WTN in such a context. Let us consider WTN again:

WTN: x is nonsense iff&b x is being excluded from the language.

And even more, let us consider a further thesis; Wittgenstein’s Theory of Nonsense applied in Science:

WTNS: x is nonsense in science iff&b x is being excluded from the scientific language-game.

I will argue that FTM is compatible with WTNS. Science is concerned with physical things. Physical things must be based, generally, in facts: as when I look at my desk, I note that it is a “fact” that my computer is on it, and that my desk and computer are “physical” things. From this, it follows that every physical thing is also referenceable, for one can point and say, “X”. Science is, in essence, to point and make observations regarding real and referenceable things. If this is the role of science, then it must be the case that statements about non-referenceable things are of no use or meaning, since they are not observational. Frege’s theory is not concerned with statements about non-referenceable things; and thus, they are useless and meaningless to his theory. If they are useless and meaningless to his theory, then it is clear that FTM can operate in the scope of science. Here is the argument in Standard Form, for clarity:

Argument For the Compatibility of FTM and the Scientific Context

1. Science is concerned with referenceable things.
2. If (1), then anything not referenceable is meaningless in a scientific context.
3. (/:.) Anything not referenceable is meaningless in a scientific context. (1,2,MP)
4. FTM states that all meaningful things are referenceable and all meaningless things are not referenceable.
5. (3) and (4). (3,4,Conj)
6. If (5), then both FTM and science are concerned with referenceable things.
7. (/:.) FTM and science are concerned with referenceable things. (5,6,MP)
8. If (7), then FTM is compatible with a scientific context.

1. /:. FTM is compatible with a scientific context. (7,8,MP)

Even further, it can be noted that the conclusion of this argument is compatible with WTNS, for the conclusion is drawn, in essence, from premises stating that non-referenceable things are meaningless/nonsense to both FTM and science. If this is the case, then WTNS is also applicable, for it is concerned with how scientific statements are used. No valid scientific statements say that, “The Earth is flat”. Such statements have been cast out from the scientific language. They are nonsense, now. And, so, WTNS and FTM (in a scientific context) are compatible. Though WTN, as a general theory of language, is at odds with FTM in other contexts (ie. any non-scientific context, which is a great majority of contexts).

VI. Conclusion

I have sufficiently shown that FTM and WTNS are compatible in the scientific context, while WTN remains the favorable theory for general language use. I demonstrated this conclusion by first giving an account of both theses, summarizing their main tenets and suppositions. Moving forward, I showed that WTN is the favorable theory, for it has more explanatory power than FTM. FTM has explanatory use in science, though. And for this reason, it must not be ignored.