On The Good Life and Games

1. Introduction

I aim to assess the fictional life of Herman Hesse’s protagonist Joseph Knecht, of The Glass Bead Game. I address two central questions in relation to his life: (i) Was Knecht’s life a good life for its subject? Furthermore, (ii) was Knecht’s life a life of playing games, and, if it was, does it count for or against the goodness of the subject’s life? In my reply to (i), I engage in serious discussion with Hurka’s work, The Best Things in Life; likewise, in my reply to (ii), I discuss central issues from Suits’s work, The Grasshopper. In pursuing these questions, I conclude that Knecht’s life was, indeed, a good life for its subject, his life was a life of games, but was not itself a game, and his involvement in game-playing contributes to the goodness of his life.

1. Framing the Questions

The answers provided to questions often depend on the nature of the question itself. Slight differentiations in phrasing can lead to exponential differentiations in the answer given. It is important, then, that the questions asked are fully understood before providing an answer. Let us take each question individually:

 

• Was Knecht’s life a good life for its subject?

 

A possible point of contention here lies in the phrase, “a good life for”. Is “a good life for” equivalent to “a valuable life relative to S”? Or, is “a good life for” equivalent to “a healthy life for S”? There are, then, two ways that this question can be taken, one of which I address in this paper and the other I do not. The first interpretation can be better understood when phrased, (i) “Is Knecht’s life a valuable life relative to its subject?”; the second interpretation can be better understood when phrased, (ii) “Is Knecht’s life a healthy life for its subject?”. I address the former and do not confront the latter.

 

• Was Knecht’s life a life of playing games, and, if it was, does it count for or against the goodness of the subject’s life?

 

I see at least two ways to interpret the question at hand. Namely, (i) “Was Knecht’s life numerically identical to a game, and, if it was, does it count for or against the goodness of the subject’s life?” and (ii) “Was Knecht only ever playing games during his life, but have the option not to, and, if he was, does it count for or against the goodness of the subject’s life?”. The first of these two questions yields a far more interesting discussion, seeing as it is fairly clear that most of Knecht’s life was engaged in game playing (as we will shall see in due time). Therefore, I will engage in a detailed response of (i) and will only briefly examine (ii).

 

• Moving Forward

 

Here are the questions at hand:

1. Is Knecht’s life a good life relative to its subject?

2a. Was Knecht’s life numerically identical to a game, and if it was, does it count for or against the goodness of the subject’s life?

2b. Was Knecht only ever playing games during his life, but have the option not to, and, if he was, does it count for or against the goodness of the subject’s life?

With these refined and further understood questions, it is now possible to move forward and begin an assessment of Joseph Knecht’s life.

III. A Good Life Relative To Its Subject

 

• An Overview of Hurka

 

In his book The Best Things in Life, Hurka provides an account of what things one may pursue in order to attain a good life. Hurka offers a pluralistic view, suggesting that there are a number of goods that one can pursue, but it is best to seek a well-rounded life with only slight specialization in a certain good. Here are a few examples of goods that Hurka discusses:

1. Pleasure,
2. Knowledge,
3. Achievement, and
4. Virtue.

Hurka’s view, then, can be demonstrated by relating two of the goods to one another in a counterfactual life. Consider a person who has the competing goods of achievement and knowledge (it is easiest to simplify and only compare two goods, rather than all four). This person can either (i) pursue as much achievement as is possible, (ii) pursue as much knowledge as is possible, (iii) pursue a well-rounded amount of both, or (iv) pursue both, but specialize in one more than the other.

(i) and (ii) inevitably lead to diminishing returns, suggests Hurka. For if one pursues as much achievement as is possible, at some point a finite amount of further achievement will have drastically less value than gaining a finite amount of knowledge. The same holds conversely. (iii) also has problems, though. For if one pursues a balanced, well-rounded amount of both goods, then one will be unable to attain a significant amount of either good. Hurka shows this with a simple example:

“The pursuit of well-roundedness is therefore most counterproductive when it stops you from acquiring any fundamentals, as when trying to learn twenty languages leaves you knowing the grammar of none”.

A well-rounded life has the problem of dissipating one’s energies and ultimately yielding little gain. This leaves the individual with (iv): pursue both goods, but specialize in one more than the other. Aiming for (iv) avoids the problem of diminishing returns associated with (i) and (ii), while also avoiding the problem of counterproductivity associated with (iii).

 

• An Overview of Joseph Knecht

 

Let us now turn to Joseph Knecht, the protagonist of Herman Hesse’s novel, The Glass Bead Game. In the fictional biography, Knecht is a talented young student of music in Castalia, the world’s hub of intellectual activity. Knecht excels to great heights throughout school, becoming “Magister Ludi”, a sort of director of the Glass Bead Game. The game focuses exclusively on making deep connections between various art forms and philosophy, but is only ever described vaguely and with no concrete detail. Ultimately, and through much introspection, Knecht chooses to leave Castalia to pursue the uniting of Castalian ideals with the outer-world. Soon after his departure, Knecht drowns as a consequence of never having learned to swim.

 

• Hurka and Knecht

 

The question of goodness in relation to Knecht’s life is particularly intriguing, considering both his vast life achievements and apparent gaining of knowledge. Let us take each life good individually.

1. Pleasure

Knecht’s pursuit of pleasure is not something covered in the book, for the most part. It is fair to assume, however, that Knecht gained pleasure through the attainment of the other goods, for many times when someone achieves or comes to know something, they experience pleasure over its being reached. It is fair to assume, then, that Knecht did come to experience pleasure as a consequence of the other goods.

We can draw an important distinction, here, which Hurka does not make in his book, but needs to be shown. Of the goods in one’s life, one can have intended goods and/or one can have side-effect goods. An intended is good is such a good that one attains through the activity of the will, while a side-effect good is such a good that one attains as a consequence of the attainment of other goods. A person that attains great achievement through his activation of the will is gaining an intended good. The pleasure that he consequently has from his achievement is a side-effect good.

A clear question then arises: Is the attainment of a side-effect good of the same value as the attainment of a good that one intended to come into the possession of? The intuitive answer is “no”. Our feeling toward this question suggests that working toward something adds some amount of value to the object, once it has been acquired. Nonetheless, a side-effect good is certainly of some value, which must, then, add to the good of one’s life.

1. Knowledge

There are two sorts of “knowledge” that Knecht encounters throughout his life. The first is the ethereal knowledge found in the glass bead game, which is, arguably, the vast majority of Knecht’s knowledge; the second is an introspective/extrospective knowledge of the world, which is a definite minority of Knecht’s knowledge (evidenced by his absurdist death, due to the lack of knowledge of basic life skills).

Hurka argues that there are three kinds of knowledge: knowledge of the self, knowledge of the world, and knowledge of how the self relates to the world. If this is the case, then a vast majority of Knecht’s knowledge does not fit in with Hurka’s definition. The glass bead game does not necessarily yield knowledge (as Hurka defines it) for it does not seem to require an accurate reflection of the goings on of the world, self, or the relation between the two. Rather, it only requires that one makes “deep connections” between the various art pieces and philosophy. But, again, it is not necessary that these connections hold true in the world outside of the game.

By the end of the book, Knecht realizes the weakness of Castalia and sets out to experience the outer-world. This directly implies that he realizes some truth about the world and his relation to it (namely, that he desires the uniting of Castalia and the outer-world). Furthermore, throughout the novel Knecht displays vasts amount of self-knowledge. Therefore, Knecht achieves knowledge of the world, self, and the relation between the world and the self (however limited this knowledge may be).

1. Achievement

The final good that is left for discussion is also the most obviously attained good in Knecht’s life. Hurka defines achievement as “master[ing] reality by imposing an idea on it”. One forms a goal in one’s mind and makes it so that the idea is realized in the world. Knecht clearly engages in this pursuit. All things that Knecht puts his mind to, he excels at. But not only does he excel, Knecht manages to be recognized for his talents, leading to many societal achievements (but primarily that of becoming Magister Ludi).

1.  Sub-Conclusion

Knecht satisfies at least three of Hurka’s criteria. He is able to have the side-effect good of pleasure, and the intentional goods of knowledge and achievement. Under Hurka’s view, though, the best life is one that has a number of goods but is able to “specialize” (to some degree) in one good, in particular. Does Knecht manage this? I think, “yes”.

Taking the three goods we have discussed, let us see if any can be considered a “specialized intentional-good”. The first in our discussion, pleasure, is merely a side-effect good in Knecht’s life, which immediately disqualifies it, for intentional goods have greater value. Secondly, much of the knowledge gained in Knecht’s life may be meaningless connections made for the perpetuation of a game, which do not correspond to reality, the self, or the relation between the two. Because of this, it is safe to assume that this is not the good we are looking for. Lastly, then, we have achievement. This good is surely something that Knecht managed to specialize in. This is evident simply in the fact that Knecht achieves a number of things throughout the novel and they fulfill Hurka’s definition of achievement.

We have therefore seen that Knecht fulfills Hurka’s criteria. If we assume that Hurka’s view is the correct view on the good life and Knecht does fulfill his criteria, then Knecht’s life is, indeed, a good life relative to its subject.

1. Game as Life and Life as Game

 

• An Overview of Suits

 

In The Grasshopper, Suits defends the thesis that a central property of life is the playing of games. But even more than this, Suits suggests that the good life is the life spent playing games. How, though, does he define a game? He offers four properties that are necessary to call something a game:

1. A prelusory goal,
   1. This can be understood as the aim to achieve a certain state of lusory affairs.
2. Lusory means,
   1. This can be understood as the accepted rules, by which one attempts to reach the prelusory goal.
3. Constitutive rules,
   1. These make it so that the player is unable to use more efficient means for reaching the goal; or, in other words, it makes the task of the game more difficult by eliminating efficient ways of winning (or achieving the game’s end).
4. Lusory attitude.
   1. This is the state of being that accepts the rules for the sake of the game.

With these four conditions, we have Suits’s definition of “game”:

Definition: x is a game only if and because x has a prelusory goal, lusory means to reach that goal, constitutive rules that restrict one from using efficient means to reach that goal, and a lusory attitude toward the activity.

 

• Knecht’s life is not a game

 

If it is the case that Knecht’s life is numerically identical to a game, as in Knecht’s life=a game, then his life must fulfill all of Suits’s criteria. I argue that Knecht’s life (and life in general) does not fulfill Suit’s criteria. Which implies that Knecht’s life (and life in general) is not numerically identical to a game. If it can be shown that he fails to fulfill one of the properties of games, then a simple modus tollens argument can show the negation of Knecht’s life being numerically identical with a game.

To begin, I do grant that the “life-game” may be able to fulfill the prelusory goal, lusory means criteria, and lusory attitude conditions. I will not attempt to define or explain how the latter two conditions might be fulfilled in any substantive way, though; later, I will offer some explanation of the first condition, for clarification. I argue that Knecht fails to fulfill the constitutive rules condition. Here is my argument in Standard Formulation, for lucidity in our discussion:

1. If Knecht’s life is numerically identical to a game, then there are some rules set in place that limit his efficiency in reaching his prelusory goal.
2. There are no rules set in place that limit his efficiency in reaching his prelusory goal.
3. /:. It is not the case that Knecht’s life is numerically identical to a game. (1,2,MT)

The argument is valid. Premise (1) is true, by definition; for if we grant Suits’s description of a game, then his third necessary condition must be fulfilled. Our conclusion also follows logically from the premises. The question, then, is whether or not (2) can be defended. If the premise does go through, then our conclusion will also be true.

Suits’s third condition is dependent on his first, in that the rules must make the goal more inefficient to reach. So, for example, if one’s game is to reach the top of a mountain, then some of the constitutive rules for the game could be to not fly to the top, take an escalator to the top, or teleport to the top. This adds the inefficiency of having to climb the mountain. What then, are some options for the prelusory goal of life? I will discuss the two that I find most intriguing:

1. The prelusory goal in life is to die well.

This option is enticing, since all humans die and the vast majority of humans want to die well. It can be argued further that much of living is done in order to achieve this end. Because of this, (1) is a possible candidate for the prelusory goal of the “life-game”.

1. The prelusory goal in life is to live well.

The second option is equally as enticing, for (perhaps aside from sociopaths, psychopaths, and self-destructive people) most humans desire to live well. This desire is manifested in vastly different, and often contradictory ways (ie. Hitler and Mother Teresa both desired to live well, but manifested these desires in drastically different ways). Even still, the base goal is often the same: to live well.

If (1) and (2) are our strongest candidates for life’s prelusory goal (which I assume to be the case, for an exhaustive list would require a paper of its own), what would be some constitutive rules that universally decrease the efficiency of achieving said goals?

All humans are born with certain limitations. Here are two of the most pertinent, which fall to two different problems:

1. Physical laws and natural laws,
2. Medical conditions, natural abilities, and social class.

(1) applies universally to all humans. Every person experiences the effects of gravity, the inability to experience the hottest of hots and the coldest of colds, and the inability to survive without certain nutritional necessities; moreover, the universality of physical and natural laws limits many things that persons could do in their absence. This universality is one possible benefit to physical laws being the constitutive rules of the life-game. There is a fatal flaw, however: physical laws do not limit a persons ability to reach the goals in question. Whether one can defy gravity holds little to no control over the efficiency to which one can either die well or live well. Because of this, (1) cannot be our constitutive rule.

(2) does decrease the efficiency in reaching the goal of the life-game. Medical conditions, natural abilities, and positioning of social class can all limit the ability to both die well and live well, to a certain degree. A problem arises, however, in the fact that they do not apply universally. One person may come into existence with critical medical conditions that inhibit their ability to live, while another does not (and the same holds true for natural abilities and social class). Constitutive rules apply universally (much like our mountain climbing case), which rules out (2) as a serious option.

We have, then, two possible prelusory goals for the life-game, each with two sets of possible constitutive rules. It has been shown that the rules do not fulfill Suits’s criteria. This defends the second premise of the argument, which allows the argument to go through. It is not the case, therefore, that Knecht’s life is not numerically identical to a game.

 

• Knecht’s life is a life of games

 

In the novel, Knecht certainly has a life of games. For one, he belongs to a society that has already set a prelusory goal, lusory means, and constitutive rules. Knecht is the variable that fulfills the final condition of having a lusory attitude. The bureaucratic structure of Castalia suggests that the prelusory goal is to contribute to the intellectual society (for Knecht, that is through the glass bead game). Moreover, Castalia has lusory means to reach this goal: the participation in their education system, and the escalation to greater, more prestigious schools, until one becomes part of the Order. Lastly, Castalia contains a number constitutive rules instituted through various hierarchicies, bureaucracies, and inefficient ways to reach the prelusory goal. Three of the conditions are fulfilled, then, by the society that Knecht lives in. The fourth condition is fulfilled by the individuals who resides in Castalia; they are the factor that perpetuates their life as a game. Knecht does decide to reside in Castalia with the lusory attitude that allows for the game to continue. Therefore, much of Knecht’s life is a life of games.

Of course, toward the end of the novel, Knecht departs from the Castalian society and aims to reconcile Castalian ideals with the outer-world. This part of Knecht’s life is not a game, for the same reason that Knecht’s life is not numerically identical to a game: he fails to fulfill Suits’s third criterion of constitutive rules. The argument runs quite similarly to the argument from the previous section:

1. If Knecht’s post-Castalian life is constituted by games, then there are some rules set in place that limit his efficiency in reaching his prelusory goal.
2. There are no rules set in place that limit his efficiency in reaching his prelusory goal.
3. /:. It is not the case that Knecht’s post-Castalian life is constituted by games. (1,2,MT)

Again, the argument is valid. And still further, (1) follows by Suits’s definition; (2) is justified by the same arguments provided in the past section; and (3) follows by modus tollens.

1.    Knecht’s life of games does add goodness to his life

It has been shown, thus far, that Knecht had periods of life consumed in game-playing. But the “goodness” of these periods depend on the conditions of Hurka’s view, which were discussed in depth earlier. If his life experiences a number of the goods and he minorly specializes in one, then he has lived a good life. The fact that Knecht has a life constituted primarily of games does not interfere with these goods being attained. In fact, two of the goods that he explicitly gains–pleasure and achievement–are achieved through his involvement with the Castalian game. His knowledge, as was shown, is primarily achieved outside of the game, for the Glass Bead Game does not necessarily produce true belief (let alone justified true belief concerning the self, the world, or the relation between the two), and thus does not necessarilly produce knowledge. Considering this, we have two goods added to Knecht’s life through game-playing and one good added to Knecht’s life outside of game-playing. It is quite clear, then, that his engagement with games did add to the goodness of his life.

1. Conclusion

It has been argued in this paper, through the philosophical views of Hurka and Suits, that the fictional life of Joseph Knecht is a good life relative to its subject. I showed this by first providing an account of Hurka’s conception of the good life, and an explanation of how Knecht fulfills his criteria. Next I demonstrated that Knecht’s life is not numerically identical to a game. This sub-conclusion was derived from discussion of Suits’s third necessary condition of game-playing. This led to the suggestion that his life was a life constituted by games. Consequently, these games added substantive goodness to Knecht’s life by providing an avenue for him to attain at least two of Hurka’s goods.

Works Cited

Hesse, Herman (1990). The Glass Bead Game. New York: Picador.

Hurka, Thomas (2011). The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters. New York: Oxford UP.

Suits, Bernard (2005), The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia, Broadview Press.